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Service Act the registrant must appear before several hearings,
where he will be asked how his "faith" would direct him to act in
certain hypothetical situations. Under the new test of the Seeger
case, he may be asked to show the board just how his "faith" has
guided and influenced his life, and its importance in his life.
It is submitted that the expansion of the Supreme Being re-
quirement will not have a great effect on the number of registrants
exempted from military service as conscientious objectors, and will
not provide an easy means of avoiding military service to those
disagreeing with the foreign policy of the United States.
Roger Sanborn
THE RIGHT TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS: ISRIN V. SUPERIOR
COURT (CAL. 1965)
INTRODUCTION
In California, an indigent plaintiff may be afforded the right to
sue in forma pauperis at the discretion of the court and thus be
exempted from the payment of all fees, including jury fees. This
rule was established by Martin v. Superior Court,' in which the
court found that this right was part of the English common law2
and as such was adopted by the California legislature.8 By reason of
Martin, the same rights, including jury trial, are to be afforded an
indigent suing in forma pauperis as would be allowed a plaintiff
able to pay all fees required by law.
THE QUALIFICATION OF THE RIGHT
Shirley Isrin suffered personal injuries in an automobile acci-
dent allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence. As a result, she
was unable to support herself. Having retained an attorney on a
contingent fee basis, the attorney expressly refusing to advance
money for costs, plaintiff Isrin requested a jury trial and petitioned
to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground that she
was indigent, without the means to pay jury fees or any other fees.
The trial court denied the petition, relying on the holding of Gomez
1 176 Cal. 289, 168 Pac. 135 (1917).
2 The statutory embodiments of the common law right were 11 Hen. 7, c. 12,
(1495) and 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, (1531).
3 CAL. CIV CODE § 22.2.
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v. Superior Court4 that an attorney acquires a contingent interest in
the litigation by the execution of a contingent fee contract and that
this is sufficient to bar his client from suing in forma pauperis. On
appeal, the Supreme Court in Isrin v. Superior Court5 found the
Gomez rule to be supported neither by sound reason nor by author-
ity and expressly overruled it, in effect returning to indigents their
right to proceed in forma pauperis.
Gomez was the first California case to decide the particular
issue of whether an indigent may sue in forma pauperis when his
attorney has been retained on a contingent fee basis.' The court
could cite no California authority for its position.7
Admitting the rule in California to be that indigents, in order to
maintain and protect their rights, should be afforded the use of the
courts to prosecute civil actions, Gomez premised its decision on the
idea that this use should not be permitted where the situation in
some manner indicated the constructive absence in the litigant of
the essential quality of destitution, the entire lack of means to pay
costs. It was apparent to the court that:
: . . where the right sought to be enforced, or to be protected, is one
in which some person who is financially responsible is either equally
or partially interested with the litigant, as by a joint, a common or a
community interest in the subject matter of the existing or proposed
litigation, the rule should not be given application.8
This meant that if the indigent should enter into a valid agree-
ment with a financially responsible person who proffers aid to the
indigent in exchange for a portion of the proceeds of the litigation,
that person acquired a contingent interest in the cause of action.
The result was the loss to the indigent litigant of his right to sue
in forma pauperis. Aid to the indigent need not have been money,
so long as the contribution by the stranger to the suit was in aid of
or incident to the contemplated or existing litigation. Services per-
formed or to be performed in connection with the suit qualified as
aid. The reason for the qualification of the right to sue in forma
4 134 Cal. App. 19, 24 P.2d 856 (1933).
5 63 A.C. 149, 403 P.2d 728, 45 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1965).
6 Admitting that no case had been decided on the issue, Gomez stated that in
both Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 Pac. 135 (1917) and Jenkins v.
Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 729, 277 Pac. 757 (1929), contingent fee contracts were
discussed or alluded to as possible obstacles to a client suing in forma pauperis, but
these cases were decided on other grounds. Though not cited by Gomez, Willis v.
Superior Court, 130 Cal. App. 766, 20 P.2d 994 (1933) could have been considered in
the same light as Martin and Jenkins.
7 All the cases cited by Gomez as authority were from other jurisdictions. All
either were not in point or have been overruled. Prior to Isrin, California was the
sole jurisdiction supporting the rule as laid down in Gomez.
8 134 Cal. App. at 21, 24 P.2d at 856.
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pauperis was the fear that unconscionable persons might acquire
rights to virtually all of the sum to be realized upon successful pro-
secution of the suit by offering a destitute litigant possessed of a
good cause of action a fraction of its potential worth.
By substituting an attorney's services for the monetary contri-
bution, Gomez envisioned the attorney as the one who sought to
derive advantage from the indigent's predicament. The suit, though
prosecuted in the indigent litigant's name, would be for the benefit
of the attorney and should not be allowed to proceed without pay-
ment of fees.
THE ISRIN CASE
While holding that the right to proceed in forma pauperis in
appropriate cases may not be denied on the ground that the attorney
for the indigent litigant is representing him pursuant to a contingent
fee contract, Isrin v. Superior Court9 agreed that the basic premise
expounded in Gomez is sound. It serves to prevent abuse of the right
to proceed in forma pauperis where the non-indigent party is the
real party in interest to the suit, the indigent litigant being merely
a representative plaintiff. Isrin disagreed with the application of the
rule of Gomez with regard to the court's decision as to the nature of
the attorney's interest in the litigation. The court sought to deter-
mine the precise nature of this interest under a contingent fee
contract. In its analysis, the court scrutinized three areas of decision
it felt would best reveal the nature of the attorney's interest. These
were decisions involving proceedings to enforce a claimed attorney's
lien, to compel substitution of attorneys and to settle a dispute over
attorney's fees by intervention in the client's action.
Attempting to discern whether an attorney's lien exists by vir-
tue of California decisions, the court found apparently conflicting
bodies of case law.' 0 Without attempting to resolve these conflicts,
the court derived its own view of the attorney's lien, that whatever
terms are utilized to characterize the attorney's lien under a con-
tingent fee contract, the lien is no more than a security interest in
the proceeds. For supporting authority, it relied on Tracy v. Ring-
ole," which stated that an attorney's lien is:
.. an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to him for ser-
vices in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in the
particular action, the attorney to the extent of such services being re-
garded as an equitable assignee of the judgment.' 2
9 63 A.C. 149, 403 P.2d 728, 45 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1965).
10 See generally Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALiF. L. REv. 587
(1940).
11 87 Cal. App. 549, 262 Pac. 73 (1927).
12 Id. at 551, 262 Pac. at 74.
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In California, the client has the right to change attorneys at
any stage of the litigation, no matter what services the attorney has
rendered or what sums he has advanced pertaining to the litigation.18
This right may not be qualified unless the attorney possesses an
irrevocable power of attorney (i.e., the attorney's power is coupled
with an interest in the subject of his agency)." As it has been held
that the mere execution of a contingent fee contract gives the attor-
ney no interest in the subject of his agency, 5 the attorney in Isrin
had acquired no interest in the litigation which would warrant the
application of the Gomez rule.
Looking to the right of an attorney to intervene in litigation for
the purpose of settling a dispute over attorney's fees, the court found
that the right of intervention is limited to actions where by virtue of
the contract between attorney and client, the attorney is given a
specific present interest in the subject matter of the litigation."6 In
situations such as existed in Isrin, it has been determined that the
interest required for intervention is not created by the execution of
a contingent fee contract.7
From its analysis, the court's conclusion was that in any litiga-
tion which an attorney conducts for a client, he acquires no more
than a professional interest. For clarity, the court adopted the view
of Clark v. United States'" that:
: * the attorney has no interest in the case as such. He is interested
in it professionally, but in no sense as a party to it. He has no present
pecuniary interest in the subject-matter. The fact that he has a right
by contract to participate in the proceeds of any judgment that may be
obtained does not make him in any true sense of the word a party in
interest. 19
The court further stated that to hold that a contingent fee contract
makes an attorney a real party in interest and therefore responsible
for advancing costs would be "to demean his profession and distort
the purpose of the various acceptable methods of securing his fee.""
Without attempting interpretation, this statement indicates the
court's attitude toward the derogatory effect of Gomez on the widely
accepted practices associated with the contingent fee contract.2'
1' Meadow v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 610, 381 P.2d 648, 30 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1963).
14 Todd v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. 406, 184 Pac. 684, 7 A.L.R. 938 (1919).
15 Scott v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. 525, 271 Pac. 906 (1928).
16 Meadow v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 610, 381 P.2d 648, 30 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1963).
17 Kelly v. Smith, 204 Cal. 496, 268 Pac. 1057 (1928).
18 57 F.2d 214 (W.D. Mo. 1932).
19 Id. at 216.
20 63 A.C. at 157, 403 P.2d at 733, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
21 Though speaking of aid in direct connection with the litigation, the language
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Isrin also considered policy grounds for overruling Gomez. The
court saw the result of Gomez to be that an indigent possessed of a
cause of action with questionable possibilities of success if litigated
may go without counsel and thus fail to assert his rights. When the
indigent's claim is virtually assured of success, both in litigation and
in payment of judgment, the indigent should have no problem in
securing counsel on a contingent basis, even if the attorney must
advance costs. But where the chances of successful litigation are
uncertain and an attorney's chances of recouping advances are com-
parably lessened, an attorney might refuse to advance costs. This
could lead to an attorney advising an indigent plaintiff not to pursue
his claim, not based upon the attorney's evaluation of the merits of
the case, but from a reluctance to advance costs. Such a circum-
stance, the court felt, should never be the cause for keeping an in-
digent litigant from the courts.
CONCLUSION
Under Gomez, the same poverty that compelled an indigent to
assert his right to proceed in forma pauperis made it virtually im-
possible for him to hire counsel. It thus had the practical effect of
restricting an indigent's access to the courts on the sole ground of
his being indigent. This result contravened the idea found in the
common law and California decisions that an indigent has the right
to proceed in forma pauperis. Isrin restored this right to the position
it was meant to occupy, as a part of the concept that persons who
seek to remedy wrongs by use of the courts should not be limited in
the enforcement of their rights because of financial standing. The
fundamental ideas of fairness and equality found in the right to
proceed in forma pauperis have again been asserted as the criteria
for determining the rights of the indigent.
William Sullivan
of Gomez intimated that the court sought to avoid the sale of a cause of action, par-
ticularly to an attorney. An attorney may sell his services but the idea that he buys
an interest in the litigation by advancing costs and rendering services is fallacious. In
California, an attorney may advance the costs of litigation, but he may not advance
sums for any personal expenses incurred by his client (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076,
Rule 3a of Rules of Prof. Conduct of the State Bar of Calif.). Whatever evil Gomez
sought to avoid will not result from the legitimate practices connected with the con-
tingent fee contract. Thus, Gomez was a mistake that required correction, which was
done in Isrin.
